In this paper, we consider multiobjective two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs and vector fuzzy payoffs. We translate such games into the corresponding multiobjective programming problems and introduce the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution concept by assuming that a player supposes the opponent adopts the most disadvantage strategy for the self. It is shown that any pessimistic Pareto optimal solution can be obtained on the basis of linear programming techniques even if the membership functions for the objective functions are nonlinear. Moreover, we propose interactive algorithms based on the bisection method to obtain a pessimistic compromise solution from among the set of all pessimistic Pareto optimal solutions. In order to show the efficiency of the proposed method, we illustrate interactive processes of an application to a vegetable shipment problem.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose interactive algorithms for multiobjectve two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs and vector fuzzy payoffs under the assumption that each player has fuzzy goals for his/her multiple expected payoffs.
Shapley [1] first defined a Pareto equilibrium solution concept for two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs, and proved the existence of a Pareto equilibrium solution by utilizing the weighting method for multiobjective optimization. Zeleny [2] formulated a two-person zero-sum game with vector payoffs as a single objective optimization problem to obtain the minimax solution. Cook [3] also formulated a two-person zero-sum game with vector payoffs as a goal programming problem, in which each player sets goals for multiple expected payoffs and the distances between them are minimized. It was shown that such a goal progamming problem is reduced to a linear programming problem. Moreover, Ghose and Prasad [4] proposed a solution concept incorporating not only the concept of Pareto optimality but also that of security levels. The concept of security levels is inherent in the definition of maximin solutions in two-person zero-sum games. Sakawa and Nishizaki [5] proposed a fuzzy approach for two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs to obtain maximin solutions which are defined from the viewpoint of maximization of the degree of minimal goal attainment [6] [7] . They showed that such a problem is reduced to a linear programming problem.
On the other hand, Campos [8] first formulated two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs as fuzzy linear programming problems to obtain the maximin solutions. Li [9] [10] also formulated special types of twoperson zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs which are represented by triangular fuzzy numbers as three-objective linear programming problems, and proposed the corresponding computation method. Bector et al. [11] , Bector and Chandra [12] , and Vijay et al. [13] [14] proposed computational methods for solving not only two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs but also two-person nonzero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs, which are based on the duality of mathematical programming techniques. Maeda [15] introduced an order relationship between fuzzy numbers with respect to two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs, and proposed a solution concept.
As a natural extension to multiobjective programming problems, Nishizaki and Sakawa [16] - [18] focused on two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs. By introducing the fuzzy goals, they formulated two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs as a linear programming problem to obtain maximin solutions. They also investigated the equilibrium solutions in two-person non-zero-sum games with fuzzy goals and vector fuzzy payoffs. However, to deal with such games as linear programming problems, they assumed that fuzzy goals for each player are defined as linear membership functions, each element of fuzzy payoffs is also defined as a linear type fuzzy number, and each player adopts the fuzzy decision [7] [19] to integrate vector payoff or vector fuzzy payoffs. Therefore, the proposed methods cannot be applied if each player adopts fuzzy goals whose membership functions are nonlinear, each element of fuzzy payoffs is defined as a nonlinear type fuzzy number, or player does not adopt the fuzzy decision to integrate vector payoff or vector fuzzy payoffs.
In such situations, in this paper, we focus on two-person zero-sum games with vector fuzzy payoffs under the assumption that a player has fuzzy goals for the expected payoffs which are defined as nonlinear membership functions. In Section 2, introducing the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution concept by assuming that a player supposes the opponent adopts the most disadvantage strategy for the self, we translate two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs into the corresponding multiobjective programming problems. We propose an interactive algorithm based on the bisection method and linear programming techniques to obtain a pessimistic compromise solution from among the set of all pessimistic Pareto optimal solutions. In Section 3, we also consider multiobjectve two-person zero-sum games with vector fuzzy payoffs, and propose an extended interactive algorithm to obtain a pessimistic compromise solution from among the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution set on the basis of the possibility measure [20] . In Section 4, as an application of our method, we consider a multi-variety vegetable shipment planning problem, which is formulated as a two-person zero-sum game with vector payoffs, and show the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Vector Payoffs
We consider two-person zero-sum games with multiple payoffs which are defined by m n × matrices R , 1, , In this section, we assume that each player has fuzzy goals for his/her expected payoffs T , 1, ,
 , where x and y are mixed strategies specified by two players. 
To deal with the multiobjective minimax problem (1), the following Pareto optimal solution concept can be defined. Definition 1.
is said to be a Player 1's pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (1) if and only if there does not exist another
with strict inequality holding for at least one k. ◊ We assume that Player 1 can find a pessimistic compromise solution from among the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution set. It should be noted here that a pessimistic compromise solution concept is different from a satisfactory solution concept employed in usual multiobjective programming problems. A pessimistic compromise solution can be interpreted as a most better solution among the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution set in his/her preference.
For generating a candidate of a pessimistic compromise solution, Player 1 is asked to specify the reference membership values [19] . Once the reference membership values 1 , 1, , k k K µ =  are specified, the corresponding pessimistic Pareto optimal solution is obtained by solving the minmax problem
By introducing auxiliary variable λ , the problem (2) can be equivalently transformed into the nonlinear programming problem
Since the inverse functions ( ) ( )
always exist because of Assumption 1, the constraints of (3) is transformed into the following equivalent inequalities:
As a result, the problem (3) is expressed as the following problem:
It should be noted here that the problem (5) can be easily solved by combined use of the bisection method and the first-phase of the two-phase simplex method of linear programming.
The relationship between the optimal solution ( )
, λ x of the problem (5) and pessimistic Pareto optimal solutions can be characterized by the following theorem.
is a unique optimal solution of (5), then
is a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (1).
(
is a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (1), then
is an optimal solution of (5) for some reference membership
is an optimal solution to (5), the following inequalities hold.
is not a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (1). Then, there exists
with strict inequality holding for at least one k . From Assumption 1, it holds that
This contradicts the fact that
is a unique optimal solution to (5).
(ii) Assume that
is not an optimal solution to (5) for any reference membership values
Then, there exists some
From Assumption 1 and the fact that 
This contradict that the fact that
λ ∈ Λ is a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (1).
♦ Unfortunately, from Theorem 1, it is not guaranteed that the optimal solution
, λ x is not unique. In order to guarantee the pessimistic Pareto optimality, we assume that the following K constraints of (5) are active at the optimal solution, i.e.,
simultaneously hold. For the optimal solution ( ) 
Theorem 2. For the optimal solution , , 1, ,
is a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution. ◊ Now, from the above discussions, we can present an interactive algorithm for deriving a pessimistic compromise solution from among the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution set.
Interactive algorithm 1:
Step 1: Player 1 sets his/her membership functions
for the expected payoffs, which satisfy Assumption 1.
Step 2: Set the initial reference membership values as 1 1, 1, ,
Step 3: Solve the problem (5) by combined use of the bisection method and the first-phase of the two-phase simplex method of linear programming. For an optimal solution ( ) * * , λ x , the corresponding Test problem 1 (7) is solved.
Step 4: If Player 1 agrees to the current pessimistic Pareto optimal solution, then stop. Otherwise, Player 1 updates his/her reference membership values 1 , 1, , k k K µ =  , and return to Step 3.
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Vector Fuzzy Payoffs
In this section, we consider two-person zero-sum games with vector fuzzy payoffs which are defined by m n × matrices , 1, ,
is an LR fuzzy number [20] , and the corresponding membership function is defined as 
In this section, we assume that Player 1 has fuzzy goals for his/her fuzzy expected payoffs T , 1, ,
  , whose membership functions are defined as follows. means an α-cut set for fuzzy sets [20] . Similarly, Player 2's membership functions
 , which are strictly increasing and continuous. ◊ Using the concept of the possibility measure [20] , we define the value of the membership function
as follows:
where
is a membership function of Player 1's fuzzy goal for the k-th payoff. Then, we can formulate the following multiobjective programming problem for Player 1 under the assumption that Player 1 supposes Player 2 adopts the most disadvantage strategy for the self.
In order to deal with the multiobjective maximin problem (9), we introduce the pessimistic Pareto optimality concept.
Definition 2.
is said to be a Player 1's pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (9) if and only if there does not exist another
with strict inequality holding for at least one k. ◊ The constraints (10) are transformed into the following forms, where , 1, ,
It should be noted here that the decision vector y disappeared in the constraints (11) . Similar to the previous section, we assume that Player 1 can find a pessimistic compromise solution from among the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution set.
This problem can be equivalently transformed into the following form:
. Since not only the inverse functions ( ) ( )
− ⋅ always exist, the k-th constraint of (13) is transformed into the following.
( )
From the above discussion, the problem (13) for Player 1 can be expressed as (
It should be noted here that the problem (14) can be easily solved by combined use of the bisection method with respect to 1 λ ∈ Λ and the first-phase of the two-phase simplex method of linear programming.
The relationship between the optimal solution ( ) * *
, λ x of (14) and pessimistic Pareto optimal solutions to (9) can be characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.
is a unique optimal solution of (14), then
is a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (9) .
(ii) If
is a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (9), then there exists
is an optimal solution of (14) for some reference membership values 1 , 1, ,
is an optimal solution to (14) , the following inequalities hold for any 1, , , 1, ,
Since the constraints of (13) are equivalent to those of (14), the following relations hold.
is not a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (9). Then, there exists X ∈ x such that ( ) ( )
with strict inequality holding for at least one k. Therefore, it holds that ( )
is a unique optimal solution to (14) .
λ ∈ Λ is not an optimal solution to (14) for any reference membership values
 . This means that there exists some
This contradict that the fact that * X ∈ x , * 1 λ ∈ Λ is a pessimistic Pareto optimal solution to (9). , λ x is not unique. In order to guarantee the pessimistic Pareto optimality, we assume that the following K constraints of (14) are active at the optimal solution, i.e., ( ) ( ) Table 2 . A price list 2 We assume that some column of the price lists arises in the future (in other words, Nature (Player 2) selects some year between 2009 to 2013). We also assume that miscellaneous costs to cultivate vegetables with manure can be ignored. Utilizing the ( ) , , x x = x  be a mixed strategy of Player 1 (the farmer), where ( ) 1 12 , , x x = x  for tomato and ( ) 13 24 , , x x = x  for cucumber. Also, let ( ) 1 5 , , y y = y  be a mixed strategy of Player 2 (Nature). For example, if 1 j y = , it follows that Nature selects the j-th year, 2008 j + . This model means that the farmer wishes to maximize its expected income taking into account the worst-cost scenario. At Step 1 of Interactive algorithm 1, suppose that Player 1 sets his/her membership functions for the expected profits T , 1, 2 k A k = x y as follows: 
